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15- The dynamics of Islamic radicalization in 
Europe 
and their prevention: a humanistic approach 
Marco Demichelis 
Giulia Mezzetti 
 
A new counter-terrorism strategy emerged after 11/09, in the 
attempt to deconstruct the reasons that motivate people to engage 
in terrorism. This policy has been broadly defined with the term 
“de-radicalization”; however, at the moment, States’ de-
radicalization programmes, such as the one implemented in Saudi 
Arabia,1 or complex intervention plans, such as the one elaborated 
by the UK government in the aftermath of the 2005 London 
attacks, do not seem to have yielded effective results. One of the 
main questions emerging after more than fifteen years is whether 
the exclusively “securitarian” approach that permeates these 
programs will ever be able to bring about efficacious solutions to 
the problem of Islamic radicalization, or to prevent radicalization 
in the West and in the Middle East2. 
What would have happened if Sayyid Qutb, before leaving for the 
United States in 1949, had acquired moderate English language 
skills and had read a few essays on North American history and 
literature? Probably, not only could he have better understood the 
country in which he then lived for two years, but he could also 
perhaps have mitigated his radicalization path and anti-Western 
positions.3 Sometimes a humanistic approach could work better 
                                                          
1  Andreas Casptack, “Deradicalization Program in Saudi Arabia: a case 
study”, in AA.VV: Understanding deradicalization: pathways to enhance 
transatlantic common perceptions and practises, Washington: Middle East 
Institute, 2015. 
2 Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard, Lawrence Rubin, Terrorist Rehabilitation 
and counter-radicalisation, London: Routledge, 2011, Intro. 
3 John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010, pp. 143-148; Patrizia Manduchi, Questo 
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than a securitarian one. This analysis does not wish to emphasize a 
conflict between different de-radicalization approaches, but 
highlight that, as long as the goal persists to be linked solely to 
security, and not to the prevention of radicalization through a 
humanistic approach, the results might not be satisfactory, as the 
post-modern creation of the Caliphate has amply demonstrated. 
The present contribution seeks to reflect on the role of education 
and schooling in preventing violent forms of extremism, in light of 
the available evidence concerning the “geography” and the 
dynamics of contemporary radicalization processes linked to 
jihadism. Before showing how education could represent one of 
the most promising grounds for the prevention of violent 
radicalization, it is therefore necessary to explore the dynamics of 
radicalization more closely – a task that we will try to fulfill in the 
following paragraph. In the concluding sections, we will argue how 
education should represent the starting point of any attempt to 
fight the spread of violent radical ideologies in the long run. 
 
I. A geography of Islamic radicalization from a 
historical perspective 
Islamic radicalization – by which we mean the adhesion to violent 
extremism linked to Islamist and jihadist ideologies - was once 
directly connected to historical events: for instance, the repression 
of Islam within Central-Asian republics since the 1930s, the 
military coup of 1991 in Algeria, which annihilated the on-going 
democratization process, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the 
Jihad in Afghanistan4 against the Soviet Union, with the return of 
the surviving Arab jihadists to their newly inhospitable countries 
of origin. On the contrary, nowadays, in Europe, the ideological – 
                                                                                                                             
mondo non À un luogo per ricompense. Vita e opera di Sayyid Qutb., Roma: 
Aracne, 2009, pp. 63-64, Demichelis Marco, Sayyid Qutb, il teorico 
dell’Islam politico. Il lungo cammino verso il radicalismo islamico, al-Hiwar, 
Torino: Centro Peirone, 2011, pp. 28-29. 
4  The 1980s’ Jihad war in Afghanistan, as reported by Ahmed Rashid, 
destroyed age-old Afghan tolerance and consensus. The civil war divided the 
Islamic sects and ethnic groups in a way that before was unimaginable to 
ordinary Afghans, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Yale University Press: New 
Haven, 2001, p.83. 
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historical reasons motivating the adhesion to jihadism of an 
impressive number of young people are less clear and harder to 
identify. Indeed, contemporary jihadism raises the issue of its 
attractiveness and its plausibility in the eyes of European youths. 
In the past, Islamic radicalization affected Islamic countries and 
had an impact only on Muslim countries: between 20000 and 
35000 Muslim/Arab fighters were recruited to fight the jihad 
during the ‘80s in Afghanistan and none of them came from 
Europe. Today on the contrary, the presence of European foreign 
fighters in Syria, as well as in the assaults in Paris, Brussels, Nice, 
Berlin etc., show the existence of many radicalized persons who 
have grown in the old continent. While until the beginning of the 
new millennium the geography of radicalization in Europe could 
be established within an uncontrolled mosque or an unknown 
prayer room, or related to a fundamentalist Imam, usually trained 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen or Sudan, with the deflagration of 
Syria and Iraq and the creation of an Islamic Caliphate, the young 
Europeans that became jihadists did not necessarily have personal 
contacts with radical mosques or imams. On the contrary, internet 
appears to be the privileged site for recruitment 5 . Actually, 
according to the accounts of many jihadists, the overwhelming 
majority of them did not attend mosques or prayer room and did 
not show any sign of religiosity prior to their radicalization; these 
people got in touch with the jihadist ideology via internet, through 
forums, chats and social networks – the most popular ones, such 
as youtube and facebook. The amazing development of these 
technological means allowed the jihadist propaganda to reach and 
persuade a number of youths that appears unprecedented – both 
in quantitative and in qualitative terms. Indeed, not only do “new 
jihadists” amount to high numbers; they are also extremely 
internally diversified, comprising both people with a migratory and 
                                                          
5 Cfr. Gilles Kepel (avec Antoine Jardin), Terreur dans l’Hexagone. Genèse 
du djihad français, Gallimard, Paris, 2015; David Thomson, Les jihadistes 
français, Les Arènes, Paris, 2014; Dounia Bouzar, Christophe Caupenne, 
Sulayman Valsan, La metamorphose operée chez le jeune par le nouveau 
discours terroriste. Recherche-action sur la mutation du processus 
d’indoctrinement et d’embrigadement dans l’islam radical, CPDSI-Centre de 
Prévention contre les Dérives Sectaires liées à l’islam, 2014, 
http://www.cpdsi.fr/nos-ouvrages-publications/. 
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Muslim background (descendants of first-generation immigrants 
coming from North African or Asian countries) and people with 
no Muslim background, descendants of Christian immigrants or of 
natives. 
This is why designing a policy aimed at tackling the spread of 
Islamic violent extremism is particularly challenging, as it should 
be able to target such a heterogeneous group of people. As we will 
seek to demonstrate in the following section, an educational-
humanistic approach could reveal one of the most promising 
grounds for the prevention of violent radicalization, both 
concerning second or third-generation migrants with a Muslim 
background, and for those who are descendants of natives. 
However, since the overwhelming majority of contemporary 
jihadists do have a migrant background 6 , we will especially 
concentrate on these persons within the following sections. 
 
II. Socio-economic conditions, Muslims’ symbolic 
integration and type of education as factors of 
radicalization 
There was probably something in common between Mohammad 
S. Khan and Hasib Hussein, both responsible for the London 
2005 bombs attacks, and Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Salah 
Abdeslam, responsible for the attacks in Paris (November 2015): 
the unbalanced correspondence between reality and the personal 
expectations that each human being creates for himself, paired 
with the impossibility to feel integrated in the society where they 
were born. It is relevant to highlight how some radicalization 
pathways move first of all from the failures of such expectations. 
The search for social justice and greater global equality could be 
identified as a classical behaviour which, for political reasons in the 
‘60s, as today, experienced a youthful enthusiasm often rooted in a 
marked idealism, in the willingness to be of service to the 
community, in a deep interest for global issues such as injustices, 
                                                          
6 Consider that in the case of France, besides children of Muslim families, 
many of the converts to jihadism are children of immigrant families having a 
religious affiliation different than the Muslim one (e.g. families originating 
from Guadeloupe or la Réunion). 
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oppression, wars : qualities and traits which are anything but 
fundamentalist or extremist or violent. However, as Moghaddam 
argues in explaining some of the conditions leading to the 
development of terrorism – in what this scholar calls the “staircase 
to terrorism”7 - some of these characteristics, on the contrary, can 
act as a detonator if intermingled with a deep perception of 
unfairness and a personal feeling of deprivation. Of course, 
considering the millions of people in the entire world who are 
conscious of the social injustice and deprivation they experience 
every day, only a limited minority tries to find a solution which 
usually clashes with the inability to change things: a factor which 
increases frustration as well as the inability to promote a change, 
according to Moghaddam8. 
This reasoning needs to be put in perspective, considering the 
wider framework of contemporary Western societies’ quest for 
identity. Identity has become a very fluid concept, less rooted in 
the geographical location of birth and in the role assumed by the 
parents in portraying the historical- social family background; it 
actually is determined by more random effects, usually related to 
individual decisions or historical changes (emigration to a foreign 
country, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979 etc). The role of the family, once able to permeate the 
offspring’s decisions for better or for worse, today has a more 
limited impact for a number of reasons which can be only briefly 
reported here: the surge in separations and divorces, the rising 
increase in youth unemployment (although youths often detain 
higher educational qualifications than their parents), the creation 
of a generalized anxiety towards various forms of sociological 
success – such as the imperatives to earn large amounts of money, 
to be handsome or beautiful, physically fit, etc. To further 
unbalance this anxiety of performance, Western society’s 
definitions of freedom and of abuse of freedom, for economic 
reasons in particular, are not clearly distinct. For instance, in the 
USA a young person aged sixteen cannot buy tobacco, cigarettes 
                                                          
7
 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism. A psychological 
exploration”, American Psychologist, vol. 60, n. 2, pp. 161-169. 
8
 ibid. p.  
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or a can of beer, but can buy an automatic weapon, or drive a car 
with 200-horsepower9. 
The above-described crucial traits of contemporary Western 
societies clash with the usual high expectations of a young man, 
maybe immigrant or Muslim, who seeks integration as a second- 
third generation representative in France or Germany, in Belgium 
or in Italy. In addition, it is fundamental to consider the dire socio-
economic conditions and the high levels of deprivation and 
marginalization faced by Muslims across Europe10. They often live 
in highly segregated and poor areas, lacking access to quality 
education and housing, and, as it has been amply demonstrated, 
are confronted with discrimination both at school and at work, 
which helps to explain the high unemployment rate for instance in 
the French banlieues 11 . Indeed, among Muslims, upward social 
mobility seems to be an exception. Deep socio-economic 
disadvantage, such as that faced by Muslim minorities in many 
European countries, contribute to explain the painful conflict 
between reality and expectations felt by many young Muslims, 
who, having been born and raised in European countries, do want 
to feel accepted as full-fledged European citizens. The reflection 
on the relationship between Islam and banlieues is old and has been 
thoroughly analyzed 12 ; this problematic connection had already 
emerged when, after the victory by “les Bleus” in the Football 
Championships of 1998, the Champs Elysées were invaded by 
young French citizens from the suburbs, whose need for a better 
integrated future deserved more attention. Almost twenty years 
afterwards, some French citizens of “the banlieues”“ have taken 
                                                          
9 Henry A. Giroux, Youth in a Suspect society. Democracy or disposability?, 
London: Springer, 2009, pp. 27ff, 69ff, 109ff.; B. Davies & Peter Bansen, 
“Neoliberism and Education”, in International Journal of Qualitative Studies 
in Education, Vol. 20 n. 3 (2007), pp. 247-259. 
10
 Cf. Richard Alba, Nancy Foner, Strangers No More. Immigration and the 
Challenger of Integration in North America and Western Europe, 2015, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
11
 Cf. Cyprien Avenel, Sociologie des quartiers sensibles, Armand Colin, 
Paris, 2010; ONZUS - Observatoire National des Zones Urbaines Sensibles, 
Rapport 2014,  
http://www.ville.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/onzus_rapport_2014.pdf. 
12 Cf. for instance Gilles Kepel, Banlieue de la République. Société, politique 
et religion à Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil, Gallimard, Paris, 2012. 
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action, blowing up the geography of Parisian entertainment, thus 
immediately drawing the public attention on the situation of many 
people like them. 
However, deprivation can only partially explain the feeling of such 
a conflict. What plays a major role is how Muslims feel to be 
perceived and treated by receiving societies. Undeniably, within 
public debates across Europe, Muslims are perceived as “inner 
enemies”. Cultural and political elites often depict Islam solely in 
terms of social and cultural “Otherness” and assign an a priori 
negative identity to Muslims, who seem to be considered 
intrinsically “problematic” “and “unintegrable”. The crystallisation 
of the Western public debate on the compatibility of Islam with 
claimed Western values and laïcité has led to a representation of 
the integration of Muslim immigrants as “failed”13 and to attribute 
to individuals and to their religion the responsibility of their 
supposed refusal to integrate and of their presumed desire to live 
“parallel lives”“, separate from and in opposition to the rest of 
society. This has hampered the process of “symbolic 
integration”“14 of Islam and Muslims. By symbolic integration, we 
mean the perception of Islam and Muslims in the public sphere as 
an accepted part of society – borrowing form and adjusting the 
definition of integration provided by Penninx15. Even if people 
with a migratory background can achieve integration from the 
socio-economic point of view, their integration in the cultural 
domain is often made impossible, due to the fact that they are 
perceived by the receiving society as irreducibly “Others”“ – this is 
                                                          
13 Cf. Jennifer Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France. Discourse, Public 
Identity and the Politics of Citizenship, Temple University Press, 
Philadelphia, 2014. 
14 Jocelyne Césari, The lack of symbolic integration of Islam in Europe, as 
illustrated by the Charlie Hebdo attacks, CritCom, A Forum for Research 
and Commentare on Europe, 10 August 2015, 
http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/the-lack-of-symbolic-
integration-of-islam-in-europe-as-illustrated-by-the-charlie-hebdo-attacks-2/. 
15
 Rinus Penninx, European Cities and their Migranti Integration Policies. A 
state-of-the-art study for the Knowledge for INtegration Governance (KING) 
Project, KING Project, Overview Paper n.5/July 2014, 
http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Penninx_OverviewPaper5.pdf 
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true especially in the case of Muslims16. This leads many young 
Muslims to feel deep sentiments of humiliation and frustration in 
relation to their origins, religion and identity. 
Such lack of symbolic integration, combined with objective 
difficult socio-economic conditions, constitutes the premises for 
the perception of a conflict between reality and expectations for 
many young Muslims and disenfranchised youths. This, in turn, 
plays a role in the formation of “oppositional identities” among 
them, especially originating from the most impoverished areas or 
regions of European countries, which leads them to embrace the 
Muslim religion especially in identitarian terms. This allows them 
to reverse the stigma of being negatively perceived as Muslims, 
precisely showing off their religious practice and identity. This 
holds especially in relation to the spread of Salafism 17 , which 
represents a strong form of cultural and identity rupture in 
contemporary Europe, as the adhesion to its tenets implies a 
refusal of modern Western society as “unholy”, “impure” and 
“depraved” – terms borrowed from the religious language to refer 
to the conflict with society. Salafism can be characterized as a 
counterculture, founded on uncompromising, ultra-Orthodox and 
ultra-conservative religious norms, which disavow Western society 
and its values18 . As such, it constitutes an extreme and radical 
choice: even if it concerns only a very small proportion of 
European Muslims, it represents a powerful source of identitarian 
cleavages. 
                                                          
16  Richard Alba, Nancy Foner, Strangers No More. Immigration and the 
Challenger of Integration in North America and Western Europe, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2015. 
17
 Juan José Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s influence and the 
radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe”, in Meria, Vol. 10 n. 3, 
(2006); Jason Burke, “Radicalisation in Molenbeek: People call me the 
mother of a terrorist”, the Guardian, 16 March 2016; Z. Fareen Parvez, 
“Representing Islam of the Banlieues: class and political participation among 
Muslims in France”, in Muslim Political participation in Europe, ed. by 
Jorgen S. Nielsen, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013, pp. 190- 
213. 
18 Mohamed Ali Adraoui, Du golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé, 
Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2013. 
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Seeking to avoid any kind of contact with all non-Muslims, the 
type of oppositional identity as the one represented by the “Salafi 
way of life” is likely to pave the way for dangerous consequences: 
in particular, we refer to the formation of identity ruptures or the 
creation of fractures along identitarian lines within European 
societies, which create the fertile ground for the success of the 
jihadist ideology. Indeed, jihadist propaganda’s goal is to 
disseminate a Manichean vision of the world, as if it was divided 
between “the good”, who are on Muslims’ side, and “the bad”, 
who are against Muslims and oppress them19. Far from being an 
over-simplification, the contents of the videos and the documents 
circulating within the so-called “jihadisphere” are based on this 
binary vision of the world and aim at dividing Western societies, 
fostering conflict and fierce opposition within them. In the same 
vein, the surge in neo-nationalistic and xenophobic movements 
and parties across the Western world constitutes a symmetric and 
specular development, as such political actors often put forward a 
similar rhetoric, erecting barriers between “us” and “them”, and 
depicting Muslims in particular as intrinsically dangerous and 
unintegrable – as briefly described above. Such visions cannot but 
undermine social cohesion and lead fringes of society to radicalize 
and embrace forms of violent extremism in the long run20.  
                                                          
19 Cf. Gilles Kepel (avec Antoine Jardin), Terreur dans l’Hexagone. Genèse 
du djihad français, Paris, Gallimard, 2015. 
20
 We do not intend to suggest that there is a direct continuity between 
Salafism and jihadism. Many scholars describe the different internal streams 
within Salafism and notably the harsh conflicts between “quietists” and 
“jihadists”. Indeed, jihadists despise quietists and Salafism cannot be 
considered as a direct “conveyor belt” of jihadism – indeed, many jihadists 
were not allegedly religious or pious Muslims. What we rather suggest is that 
the diffusion of Salafism, with its oppositional habitus, contributes to spread 
a divisive conception of society, i.e. “us (good Muslims)” vs “them (the 
depraved rest of the world)”. Such a Manichean vision of the world facilitates 
the spread of jihadism in that it makes it “plausible” and “attractive” in an 
“ecological” perspective (in sociological terms). In other words, the success 
of jihadism is rooted in the identity cleavage that Salafims purports. Cf. Fabio 
Introini, Giulia Mezzetti, “Storie di jihadismo. Il processo di radicalizzazione 
e la sua plausibilità”, in XXII Rapporto ISMU sulle Migrazioni 2016, Franco 
Angeli, Milano, 2016, pp. 293-318. 
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However, in addition to identity-related issues and socio-economic 
deprivation, it is crucial to consider the type of education that even 
highly skilled persons receive during their schooling years21. Paul 
Vallely, quoting a study of the British Council, argued that, 
contrary to a common understanding, almost half (48.5%) of the 
Jihadists recruited in MENA areas had a university education; 
among them, 44% had degrees in engineering. This percentage 
greatly increased if we consider Western – recruited jihadists: 
59% 22 . Gambetta and Hertog 23 , considering the distinction 
between violent jihadists and non-violent radicals, highlight the 
over-representation of engineers among the latter to be slighter, 
though still significant, among jihadists. They note that though 
engineers are over-represented in both categories, violent and 
more peaceful Islamic groups, holders of other elite degrees, such 
as medicine and natural sciences, are much more strongly 
represented among the latter. Islamism seems to be appealing to 
both, but engineers seem much more prone to taking the step 
towards violence.24 Another recent study showed how terrorists 
were more likely to hold technical and applied degrees: medicine, 
applied science and especially engineering; non-violent radicals, by 
contrast, were much more likely to study arts, humanities and 
social sciences. 25  This, if confirmed, would suggest that the 
transition from one category to the other is not at all the smooth 
and slippery slope that anti-terrorism theorists imagine, and that 
forms the basis of much security rhetoric. 26  Although all these 
information either relate to Muslim countries – where conditions 
                                                          
21
 According to the available evidence, the vast majority of jihadists holding 
university graduated in scientific subjects: Engineering, Medicine, 
Information Technology, etc. Paul Vallely, Are Scientists easy prey for 
Jihadism? The Guardian, 3 December 2015. 
22
 Martin Rose, Immunising the Mind. How can education reform contribute 
to neutralising violent extremism?, British Council, November 2015. 
23 Diego Gambetta, Steffen Hertog, Engineers of Jihad, Sociology Working 
Paper n.10, Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007. 
24
 Diego Gambetta, Steffen Hertog, Engineers of Jihad, p. 35.  
25
 Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell and Michael King, The Edge of Violence: 
A Radical Approach to Extremism, London: Demos 2010, p.24. 
26
 Martin Rose, Immunising the Mind. How can education reform contribute 
to neutralising violent extremism?, p. 7. 
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on the ground are entirely different in comparison to Europe27 - or 
to the “first generation”“ of jihadists – while the new forms of 
jihadism presents unprecedented characteristics than “old 
jihadism” 28 , we believe it is nonetheless extremely meaningful. 
Indeed, scientific education, with its rigour and its indisputability, 
can lead the individual to not properly consider nuances. Therefore, 
receiving only scientific education can facilitate the adoption of 
binary vision of the world (black vs white). 
Therefore, we propose to integrate into Moghaddam’s “Staircase 
to Terrorism” the consideration of the above-described relevant 
factors, i.e. 1) socio-economic conditions – which can lead to 
strong feelings of frustration in the face of thwarted personal 
expectations; 2) identity-related issues and the perception of a lack 
of symbolic integration – which may lead to the formation of 
identity cleavages and to conceive society as if it was divided 
between “us” and “them”; 3) the type of education received – 
which can lead to adopt binary visions of the world (black vs 
white). The ground – floor level of the staircase, in which the 
perceptions of injustice may arise for a variety of reasons, 
including economic and political conditions and threats to 
personal and collective identity, needs to be paired with 
individuals’ level of education: for example, if on the one hand, a 
Muslim radical who gained a university degree in a scientific 
subject cannot usually show “symptoms of poverty”, the real 
perception of injustices as threats to personal and collective 
identity passes through a scientific methodological approach, 
acquired through exclusive scientific education, in which “black 
and white” are predominant over grey. This is the first step which 
can incentivize a radicalization- process: to consider historical 
events as European colonialism or the birth of Israel (1948) with 
excessive clarity, as if right and wrong were clearly identifiable, 
where the complexity of the problem is unconsidered, while 
demagoguery and easy ideologisation take over. 
                                                          
27  Khosrokhavar explains why, since the ‘90s, Jihadism attracted mostly 
persons belonging to the middle class in Muslim countries in North-Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia. Cf. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Radicalisation, Paris, 
Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2014. 
28
 Cf. Gilles Kepel (avec Antoine Jardin), Terreur dans l’Hexagone. Genèse 
du djihad français, Paris, Gallimard, 2015. 
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“Plato warned on the inevitable collapse of a society that does not 
allow for the rise of talented individuals in the social hierarchy and, 
correspondingly, the downward mobility of those who lack talent 
but are the offspring of those in power”29. If we add to the above 
forma mentis the impossibility of attaining the expected results 
against personal expectations: a post-graduate job, for example, 
due to the lack of meritocracy within a society that despite being 
democratic has maintained relevant integrative problems; the inner 
radicalization of the individual actor can only increase (second 
step). 
The third step is reached when in addition to the above-described 
psychological melting pot of pre-radicalization, the help in 
rediscovering a fundamentalist renewed religious affiliation comes 
from outside: a recruiter, or a propaganda video, which in a 
specific moment of a state of depression, outlines a morality that 
justifies a struggle to achieve a perfect society, a better world. If 
this passage succeeds, the new recruit is persuaded to be 
completely disengaged from the previous morality, from the 
family, from preceding friends, to enter a secret, isolated, quite 
fearful organization; a parallel life is already started and if on the 
one hand their normal daily existence continues, a second one, 
made up of victimization and conspiracy, both characteristics well 
rooted in the psychological background of the young radicalized, 
will continue to entrench the previous one, is increasingly 
perceived as a masked existence that is increasingly rejected. 
The consolidation of fundamentalist thinking, which leads to 
believe that being part of a terrorist organization is the best way to 
reach an ideal end, is the conclusive step before the final 
immolation. This fourth step is significant because, if not properly 
carried out, it could still bring the recruit to doubt in the end, 
being overwhelmed by fear.  
The conclusive step, which collides with the terrorist attack, has 
finally sublimated the “us” vs. “them” and the perception, made 
even easier today in the exclusivist ideological Neo-Wahhabi 
perception, that anyone who is not actively resisting against the 
                                                          
29
 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism. A psychological 
exploration”, p. 163. 
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new crusaders and Zionists, even if Muslim, is a legitimate target 
of violence.30 Prevention of radicalization is a long term solution 
which could not only be related to a securitarian approach, but 
also to a psychological and didactic one. 
 
III. For the prevention of radicalization in Europe: an 
educational – humanistic approach 
That prevention is a long-term solution to terrorism is certainly 
self-evident; that prevention should be based on an educational- 
humanistic approach, which takes longer than the ongoing 
securitarian one adopted in Europe since the bomb attacks in 
Madrid and London, is less self-evident. 
In an article published in the New York Times (20 Nov. 2014), 
Janet Breslin and Smith Caryle Murphy stressed that the presence 
of humanities within the Saudi Arabia academic system had been 
partially incentivised on a scene that was already not particularly 
idyllic. During the reign of ‘Abdullah bin’ Abdulaziz al-Saud (2005-
2015) in fact, although the number of universities increased from 8 
to 25, the curricula accentuated a specific inadequacy in relation to 
the humanities and within the universities of religious studies, 
where the majority of A’immah (pl. of imam) are trained, the 
inappropriateness to ensure an interdisciplinary study methodology 
that is able to create links between Islamic religion and history, 
geography, law, sociology, philosophy and mystics encouraging 
inter-disciplinary research. 
On the contrary, the Saudi education board has touted an ideology 
whereby every citizen must exclusively be a “Muslim citizen” 
aware of religious values and ready to be integrated in a society 
that accepts change only if this transformation is rooted in Islam, 
or better in the Islamic ideology as shaped by Neo-Wahhabism: 
reflecting on the economic and financial sectors, Islamic precepts 
have been largely neglected since the 1970s in Saudi Arabia as in 
the majority of the Arab Gulf countries, having been re-shaped to 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 16. 
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encourage the creation of a capitalist economy with the concrete 
support of the religious jurists31. 
Educating children in schools differently could be the preventive 
approach necessary to counter form of violent radicalization and 
growing religious extremism, at least in Europe in no less than 
fifteen years. The strategy to identify and eliminate individual 
religious extremism and terrorism could reveal expensive and 
counter-productive, because as long as conditions on the field 
remain the same, every violent extremists who is eliminated is 
quickly replaced by others. Eradicating the possibility that they 
could be replaced is probably the best solution that European 
societies could put into practice without transforming themselves 
into autocracies but only by strengthening their educational 
system. Obviously, long- term securitarian policies need to be kept 
alert, but psychologists, inter-cultural mediators as well as teachers 
and professors need to play a prominent role in order to favor the 
adoption of a different humanistic approach for the prevention of 
radicalization within national European education systems. 
The best viable solution appears to be the implementation of an 
approach able to fight categorizations and the formation of 
oppositional identities, as described above: Us vs. Them, 
Orientalism vs. Occidentalism, Christians vs. Muslims, Burkinis vs. 
bikinis etc. Such labeling process can only but endorse the views of 
fundamentalists and radicals, and increases the probability that 
more individuals will engage in violent extremism. 
It is easy to imagine that the young terrorists who hit Paris, 
Brussels or London, having or not an educational qualification (in 
the case of the 2005 London attack, terrorists had reached a 
university graduation), had passed through a national education 
system, having spent some years in schooling. What would have 
been of these people, had the schools system been designed so as 
to avoid their failures? What would have been of these people had 
they encountered in their school life teachers able to open their 
minds? 
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 Janet Breslim, Smith Caryle Murphy, The Struggle to Erase Saudi 
Extremism, New York Times, 20 Nov. 2014. 
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As we have attempted to argue, schooling plays in any case a 
crucial role. However, for the school system to be transformed in 
an effective resource to counter violent radicalization and 
extremism, two steps are necessary: 1. make the educational system 
more equitable at the European level – in order to tackle social 
disadvantage, which plays a significant role (cf. Previous) ; 2. train 
teachers to the adoption of a humanistic approach on the basis of 
interdisciplinary textbooks and curricula. 
This first step concerns ensuring effective equal opportunities in 
education, combating inequalities, segregation in schools and 
equipping students with all the means in order to climb the social 
ladder. This is necessary in order to obtain a more egalitarian level 
of education in the EU32, which has been achieved in countries 
such as Norway, Finland, Denmark, but has not yet been realized 
in other countries such as France and UK. Actually, the 
educational systems of the latter pose a double problem in relation 
to the public- private system debate (in Scandinavia there is no 
private system), and to the main differences between élites schools 
and the other schools, especially in suburbs and peripheries33. 
The second step is more related with the educational contents; 
within European educational systems, curricula’s contents hardly 
contain modules devoted to the history, religions, literature, art of 
parts of the world other than Europe. Indeed, schools curricula 
seem to not take into account that the composition of schools 
cohorts is increasingly diversified in terms of cultural, ethnic and 
religious origins and migratory backgrounds of students. Thus, a 
second-generation student, with an Algerian, Nigerian or 
Ethiopian migratory background, has hardly ever the chance to 
study the history, literature or art of parts of the world different 
                                                          
32
 All European data are collected by Europe 2020 indicators- education. 
Some important data can be found directly on this website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-
_education#Main_statistical_findings 
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 All European data are collected by Europe 2020 indicators - education. 
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than Europe, during his or her schooling years. Frequently, 
second-generation boys and girls live in the outskirts of major 
European cities, where it takes more than an hour to reach the city 
center and find a well-stocked bookshop, and must face acts of 
discrimination and racism on a daily basis. Therefore, these youths’ 
growing expectations as adolescents are thwarted by the 
consciousness that “the Europe of democracy and human rights” 
will always consider them as foreigners, and they must cope with 
very scarce possibilities to improve their social position34. 
Prevention of radicalization needs to start from integration at 
school, where the history, art, literature, music and religion of 
those who are perceived as “Others” are considered as relevant as 
that of the “old continent”; all the more so when significant 
proportions of classes’ compositions are made up of students 
without a European cultural background. Such an approach does 
not intend to abolish traditions such as Christmas parties at school: 
integration takes place in a precise context, and the cultural traits 
of that context must be known and understood by children of 
immigrants. However, it aims at the interdisciplinary integration of 
“Others” humanities in a continent where out of 500 million 
inhabitants, 34,3 are composed by people that were born in a non-
EU state35. The claim, here, is about the necessity of designing an 
integrative education policy with the goal of preventing violent 
radicalization, focusing on humanities – specifically, on the 
interconnections between history, literature, religion, history of art, 
music, etc. 
For instance, each subject, regardless of the number of hours, has 
to be redesigned in relation to a less Eurocentric and more 
comparative approach. What happened in Europe or France in the 
18th century, and in parallel in the rest of the world? Does Dante’s 
Divine Comedy really have Islamic eschatological origins? Is it 
possible to study Music without exploring the history of black 
slavery? The Ottoman architect, Mimar Sinan and Brunelleschi- 
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 Cf. Cyprien Avenel, Sociologie des quartiers sensibles, Paris, Armand 
Colin, 2010. 
35
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Migrant_
population  
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Michelangelo, a comparative approach in art-history, etc. The 
reconstruction of the history of religious coexistence, of cultural 
hybridizations and reciprocal influences, as well as of religious 
conflicts in Europe are crucial in this respect. Topics are unlimited. 
The university level is facilitated by a number of courses that are 
usually chosen by students out of personal interest, but what can 
be done in scientific faculties? Until 2015, to quote an example, the 
Polytechnic of Turin (Italy) organized free courses of Arabic and 
Middle Eastern history and culture, but also Chinese for students 
interested in studying foreign languages and humanities. 
Such intercultural curricula could also contribute to solve the 
legacy of troubled colonial pasts, which often represent a cause of 
resentment among migrants and especially among their 
descendants, posing issues concerning their self-identification and 
sense of belonging. An unresolved colonial past (for instance, the 
one binding France and Algeria) is likely to emerge within 
educational institutions taking subtly oppressive forms, such as 
inadequate study of colonialism and of its consequences 36  or a 
complete disregard for former colonies’ history and culture. This 
adds to more explicit acts of discrimination at school, which 
constitute a source of suffering and an obstacle for social 
mobility37. 
In any case, an important part of preventive work has to be 
planned in the field of the pre-university school system. In order 
to prevent the formation of oppositional identities, potentially 
                                                          
36
 For instance, in 2005 the French government passed a law by which school 
programs should have acknowledged “the positive role of the French 
presence overseas and in particular in North Africa”. A period of vibrant 
protests ensued, with scholars and politicians expressing their harsh criticism 
against the State’s decision to promote positive depictions of French 
colonialism. The law was eventually repealed in 2006. See: 
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loi_portant_reconnaissance_de_la_Nation_et_c
ontribution_nationale_en_faveur_des_Fran%C3%A7ais_rapatri%C3%A9s 
37
 With reference to the French case, see for instance Gilles Kepel, Banlieues 
de la République. Société, politique et religion à Clichy-sous-Bois et 
Montfermeil, Paris, Gallimard, 2012, or Laurent Mucchielli, Autumn 2005: a 
Review of the Most Important Riot in the History of French Contemporay 
Society, in “Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies”, vol. 35, n. 5, 2009, pp. 
731-751. 
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conducive to violent radicalization, it is necessary to start since the 
elementary level of education. Each education system has a 
multifunctional purpose, which is not only linked with acquiring 
“knowledge”, writing skills and a basic culture; but to promote a 
first plural approach in a society in itinere. Every educational 
method that appeared in the 20th century, from Montessori to 
Steiner, from Feuerstein to Gordon, highlighted the balanced 
growth of the child between the acquisitions of competences 
respecting the individual maturation of the pupil38. 
 
Conclusive Reflections 
The education system can certainly not make up for the absence of 
family ties, the presence of a healthy parenthood, and the 
recognition of the love of the parents by the child. However, 
school is the first “geography of integration” that every child will 
encounter during his life. While the family should be able to give 
the ability to face the outer world from an emotional point of 
view, education should to be able to give children a place in it as 
well as a clear and realistic expectation for their future. 
It is usually proven that the good charisma of a teacher or 
professor during the formative age, at intermediate, high school or 
university levels, has the capacity not only to create interest in his 
or her subject, but to plan a training program for the student. An 
educational system that can integrate pupils and students from 
different social and cultural backgrounds is a school in which 
teachers and professors are trained and textbooks are prepared 
considering the ongoing problems of integration in society. The 
capacity to prevent different forms of radicalization, not only 
referring to the Islamic one, passes through the educational 
system’s capabilities to rearrange programs and curricula, so as to 
be able to deliver notions and talents through a plural and 
diversified methodology. The solution is not to eliminate the 
history of the Roman Empire, or of Athenian democracy, 
Shakespeare or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but to put every subject 
into relation with other geographies, writers, philosophers, and 
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 Jael Kopciowsky Camerini, Il Metodo Feuerstein. L’apprendimento 
mediato, Brescia: la Scuola editore, 2015. 
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historical events. Fighting and preventing the ignorance of 
religious radicalization should start from here. Such an approach 
would help counter the hypostatization of a binary vision of the 
world (“us” versus “them”) that is central in every form of violent 
radicalization. 
The role of schooling for countering the spread of violent 
extremist ideologies and attitudes and for containing forms of 
radicalization can thus prove crucial, as the years spent in 
education are pivotal for developing critical thinking and for 
acquiring the capability to go more in-depth and look beneath 
appearances, i.e. the only resources against bigotry, categorizations, 
simplistic accounts of global and complex phenomena, such as 
those heralded both by jihadists and xenophobes and 
supremacists. Broadly speaking, education should lay the 
foundations in order to build a wide cultural background; for the 
overwhelming majority of students, schooling is the only way for 
gaining notions and knowledge, which would not be otherwise 
accessible for them. If the curricula of European and North-
American educational systems were in line with the times, they 
would include modules devoted to cultures and the history of 
other parts of the world, in order to better respond to the needs of 
an increasingly diversified student population – which includes 
more and more pupils with a migratory background. 
However, we maintain that a humanistic approach to tackle 
radicalization – based on the teaching of intercultural knowledge 
and on the study of the history, literature and art of different 
cultures – works also for preventing the radicalization of young 
people with no migratory background (who now form a significant 
portion of the “new jihadists”). Indeed, due to ignorance or 
insufficient cultural knowledge, they could fall too into the trap of 
adopting Manichean vision of the world and to experience identity 
ruptures – and such an approach is aimed precisely at fighting 
labeling, categorizations and oversimplifications of reality.  
These aspects – the exigency to develop more equitable education 
systems, the need to include in school curricula the teaching of 
notions concerning other cultures and religions, as well as a honest 
recognition of the colonial legacy – could all play a role in the 
symbolic integration of migrants and especially of those of Muslim 
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religion within European societies, and could contribute to open 
the minds of those with no migratory background. 
 
